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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 10-2338
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MAURICE OUTEN,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1-09-cr-00170-001)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 11, 2011
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 25, 2011)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Maurice Outen was convicted of possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or
more of a substance that contains cocaine base. On appeal, he claims that his trial

counsel was constitutionally ineffective and that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
On May 14, 2009, officers with the Swatara Township Police Department were
approached by Emrica Smalls in a hotel parking lot near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
Smalls asked the officers for their help in retrieving clothes left in a hotel room rented by
Outen, her former boyfriend. Smalls told the officers that Outen was trafficking drugs
from the room. Outen refused the officers’ request to accompany Smalls to retrieve her
things and suggested that a hotel employee would go to the room instead. While Outen
and the employee were in his room, one of the officers saw two handheld mixers, plastic
baggies, acetone, and a box for a digital scale inside a trashcan outside Outen’s room.
Smalls remained in the parking lot and informed the officers that Outen was using his
rental car to transport drugs. When they approached the car, officers observed a clear
plastic bag containing a white powder sticking out from underneath a floor mat. Outen
came back out to the parking lot, and the officers arrested him. Smalls also told the
officers that Outen was hiding cocaine in the ceiling of the hotel’s gym. As Smalls
predicted, officers found underneath the ceiling tiles a bag containing a scale, powder
cocaine, crack cocaine, and a receipt for Outen’s hotel room. After obtaining a search
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warrant for Outen’s hotel room and rental car, officers discovered cocaine and various
drug paraphernalia.
Outen was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania for possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of a substance
that contains cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).1
The government presented testimony from the officers describing what they found in
Outen’s hotel room, rental car, and in the gym. A jury convicted Outen and the District
Court sentenced Outen to 136 months’ imprisonment. He timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Outen
advances two claims on appeal, namely, that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to properly articulate the theory that Smalls planted the evidence against him and
(2) the conviction is against the weight of the evidence. We address each in turn.
Outen argues that his trial counsel failed to assert to the jury that Smalls had
motive and opportunity to plant the incriminating evidence. We decline to address the
merits of Outen’s claim on direct appeal because “it has long been the practice of this
court to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral attack.” United
States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Thornton, 327
F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003)). We depart from that practice “[w]here the record is
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sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance of counsel[.]” United States v.
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991). The record here is not complete enough
for us to make a determination as to Outen’s ineffective assistance claim. See, e.g.,
United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, we must decline
to reach the issue at this juncture.2
As to Outen’s second argument, he asserts that the conviction was against the
weight of the evidence and that there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty
verdict. Outen confuses a challenge to the weight of the evidence with a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. The concepts are distinct. See United States v. Silveus, 542
F.3d 993, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 2008). The proper manner to argue that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence is through a motion for a new trial. Outen did not file
such a motion. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “[o]n a defendant’s
motion, the court may grant a new trial to that defendant if the interests of justice so
require.” “Under this rule, a judge has no power to order a new trial on his own motion”
because “[a] judge can act only in response to a motion timely made by a defendant.”
United States v. Wright, 363 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). Because Outen never moved for a new trial in the District Court
under a Rule 33 motion, we will not address his weight claim here.

1

28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) was amended pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, effective August 3, 2010, to replace fifty grams with 280
grams of a mixture or substance that contains cocaine base.
2
Of course, this disposition does not preclude Outen from pursuing his ineffective
assistance claim in a collateral proceeding.
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Insofar as Outen attempts to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, “we must
sustain the verdict if a rational trier of fact could have found [the] defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” United
States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2007). We will review for plain error
because Outen did not raise this claim before the District Court. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
52(b); United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1999). “A conviction based on
insufficient evidence is plain error only if the verdict constitutes a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.” Thayer, 201 F.3d at 219. The government had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Outen knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine or crack
cocaine with the intent to distribute. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, see McKee, 506 F.3d at 232, we determine that substantial evidence
supports the conviction. The government introduced a plethora of evidence of Outen’s
drug trafficking, including cocaine wrapped in Outen’s hotel room receipt and various
drug paraphernalia found in his room, rental car, and the hotel gym. Although Outen
claims that Smalls planted the evidence against him, there is ample evidence to support
the jury’s finding. See id. at 233. We cannot say it was plain error for the jury to have
convicted him.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment and sentence of the District
Court.
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